This paper investigates the process of banking integration in the EU15 countries and the Eurozone by testing for convergence in bank efficiency among commercial banks. We use a two-step approach: First we estimate efficiency by applying an innovative methodological approach that treats banks' non-performing loans as an undesirable output. Second, we apply 
Introduction
Following the introduction of the Single Market by the European Commission in 1992, several initiatives and regulatory reforms have been implemented to create a fully functioning single market. The integration of the European banking sector is integral to this ambition. Evidence from recent studies based on data prior to the financial crisis show that while the European banking sector has been integrating, some fragmentation are still inherent due to national characteristics (Baele, 2006; Affinito and Farabullini, 2006; Vajanne, 2007, and Rughoo and Sarantis, 2012) .
As widely reported, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has uncovered several systemic weaknesses amongst European banks which have resulted in higher credit, refinancing and sovereign risks. A current analysis of European banking integration would provide a deeper insight into the impact of the GFC on the functioning of the single banking market. We argue that the unprecedented scale of governmental bailouts could distort the competitiveness within the Euro area and Eurozone. The competitiveness could be distorted above all by the fact that some key market players have received unfair advantages through cheaper capital and funding.
For example, the UK's estimated package could reach US $1.1 trillion in order to restore confidence in the banking system. In Denmark, 13 of the country's 140 banks were bailed out by the central bank or acquired by their competitors. The expected volume of the rescue package is estimated to be EUR 593.9 billion (European Commission, 2012 , Bloomberg, 2009 ). This paper contributes to the ongoing empirical research on banking integration in several ways. Firstly, assuming that the integration process has been significantly undermined and to some extent undergone a reversal due to the GFC, we investigate whether the single market 3 initiative for a homogenous and competitive banking market has extended to the cost structures and efficiency of banks. In particular, we examine the impact of the GFC and the ensuing Eurozone sovereign debt crisis on bank efficiency. Secondly, we analyse and estimate the convergence of the European banking system using the Phillips and Sul convergence technique which provides an empirical assessment of long-run equilibrium within a heterogeneous setup without necessitating any assumptions about stationarity. Thirdly and finally, we estimate the competition level in European banking pre-and post-crisis by deploying the Rosse-Panzar method.
To estimate bank efficiency, we apply a parametric distance function approach using both desirable and undesirable outputs in the production process (i.e. NPLs). This novel approach of measuring bank efficiency is motivated by the fact that ignoring NPLs can bias the efficiency results (Assaf et al. 2013; Fujii et al. 2014) . The inclusion of NPLs in our estimation is even reinforced by the fact that the average bank asset quality for most EU member states has plummeted significantly following the economic recession. To test bank convergence, we propose the Phillips and Sul (2007) methodology which provides important advantages over the widely used β-convergence and σ-convergence methods. 7 . The β-convergence, for instance, is uninformative on the behaviour of the dispersion of the entire cross-section, while the σ-convergence does not allow for cases where individual countries may be transitionally divergent (Quah, 1996; Islam, 2003) . The Phillips and Sul convergence technique, on the other hand, identifies whether group convergence is present and whether sub-clusters of countries are converging. It also enables the estimation of the relative transition parameters for each country in relation to the panel average. This gives us additional information on the speed of the convergence process over time.
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Finally, to provide a full picture of bank performance and convergence, we also examine the degree of competition within the banking systems. We apply a standard non-structural approach based on the Rosse-Panzar methodological framework. The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on efficiency and integration in the EU banking sector. Section 3 and 4 describe the methods and data used. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and finally Section 6 concludes.
Literature review on bank efficiency and convergence in the EU
Brouwer (2005) defines financial market integration as a process whereby financial markets become increasingly integrated through the linkages created by prices and returns on financial assets. As discussed by Stavarek et al (2012) , one crucial conduit for financial integration is the integration of financial infrastructure which consists of a set of inter-connected systems such as payment systems 8 and credit registers that facilitate financial market operations.
Consequently, the integration of financial infrastructure should lead to cost savings and create a more efficient financial market. Empirical research focusing on the efficiency of European banks has attracted considerable attention over the last decade. Studies have linked the efficiency of the banking industry to several interesting hypotheses such as integration and convergence, competitiveness and systemic stability within the European Union. In general, there is support that greater competition, faster technologies, financial innovations, economic and financial freedom have driven banks to minimize costs and improve their efficiencies (Fiordelisi and Molyneux,2010; Chortareas et al, 2013) . Given the link between competition and the growing focus on improving efficiency, it can be said that within an integrated or integrating retail banking sector, these forces should translate into convergence in bank efficiency.
The link between efficiency and integration in the European banking sector has been widely investigated (Molyneux et al. 1997; Goddard et al. 2007; Brissimis et al. 2010 , Fiordelisi et al.. 2011 The β-convergence is drawn from the growth literature and models the "catch-up effects" by regressing the growth rate of a variable on the initial level while σ-convergence looks at the dispersion of the cross-section. Convergence is evident is the dispersion decreases over time. 10 These findings are also subject to robustness checks including two other frontier techniques namely, a timevarying WITHIN model and a distribution free approach (DFA) model as well as the use of the production approach instead of the intermediation approach in the event that the specifications of inputs and outputs have biased the results.
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Our study aims to provide additional evidence on the above using a more robust efficiency measure that accounts for NPLs, and also a more robust test of convergence.
Furthermore we focus on the impact of the GFC which has largely been ignored in existing studies, and estimate the competition level in European banking pre-and post-crisis using the Rosse-Panzar method. We elaborate on these contributions in the remaining sections of this paper.
Methodology

Bank Efficiency with undesirable outputs: A parametric distance function
Several studies have provided evidence that ignoring NPLs as an undesirable output in the production process can bias and potentially inflate the efficiency results (Fernandez et al. 2002; Atkinson and Dorfman, 2005; Park and Weber, 2006; Assaf et al, 2013; Fujii et al. 2014 ).
The famous framework proposed by Berger and DeYoung (1997) also suggests a strong relationship between loan quality and efficiency in both directions. A bank with low NPLs for example, might seem to be low performing in comparison to another bank with high NPLs just because the production process did not clearly differentiate between good and undesirable outputs.
We can write the production process ( , , ) P x y b with undesirable outputs as follows: 
This enhanced hyperbolic distance function has the advantage of dealing with both desirable and undesirable outputs asymmetrically, thus providing a more comprehensive representation of the production process 12 .
The model in (2) can become even more flexible if we adopt the hyperbolic translog distance function, which, in a panel data context, can be expressed as follows
where * , * are the normalized good and undesirable outputs to ensure homogeneity 13 , and is an error term. We can also add to (3) another one sided error representing inefficiency:
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The efficiency estimates each bank can be calculated by substituting these values into the following equation:
Phillips and Sul convergence methodology
The main view we adopt in this paper is that integration is beneficial to the EU banking markets as in theory; it should improve efficiency and competition by affecting the cost structures of banks. The Phillips and Sul panel convergence methodology 14 we use in this paper consists of a log t regression test of convergence. This approach is well suited in the context of this study as it is based on a time-varying assumption which allows for both common and individual heterogeneity over time. This convergence approach thus enables us to identify whether the EU banks' are converging on the efficiency front and if so, we can analyse the speed of convergence over time. The convergence method also includes a club convergence algorithm which detects possible clusters of convergence. We believe that using such a test in this paper will enrich the analysis and provide new insight about whether clusters of convergence in banking efficiency exist in our sample. The Phillips and Sul's (2007) clustering algorithm is based on repeated log t regressions and consists of four steps. For details on each of these steps, refer to Rughoo and Sarantis (2012) . 9
Market competitiveness: Rosse-Panzar Model
Several studies in the literature test for competitiveness conditions in European banking industry (Nathan and Neave, 1989; Perrakis, 1991; Molyneux and Forbes, 1995; DeBandt and Davis, 2000; Matthews et al. 2007 ). The market competitive conditions are measured by estimating a reduced from log-linear revenue equation:
Where REV is the ratio revenue to total assets of a bank i at time t, represents the input prices and are bank specific variables that may determine bank's revenue and cost functions. We deploy the following two variables: The asset size of banks (Assets) can be seen as a proxy for scale economies and we also include bank liquidity (Liq) provided by Bankscope and defined as net loans to total assets that captures asset liquidity risk. is a stochastic disturbance term. Market power is measured by the extent to which a change in factor input prices (dqm,i) for m = 1,..., n is reflected in a change in equilibrium revenue (dREV*it). Panzar and Rosse (1987) define a measure of competition H as the sum of the elasticities of the reduced-form revenue function with respect to factor prices:
where  H ≤ 0 indicates monopoly or short-run oligopoly  0 < H < 1 indicates a monopolistic competition.
 H = 1 indicates a perfect competition.
One problem with Rosse-Panzar model, however, is that the H-statistic can be misleading if the market is in long-run equilibrium. This suggests that competitive capital markets will equalise risk-adjusted rates of return across banks such that, in equilibrium, rates of returns should not be significantly correlated with input prices (for details see Matthews et al., 2007; Molyneux and Forbes, 1995 and Shaffer, 2004) .
The equilibrium test defines the dependent variable as pre-tax profit to total assets:
Equilibrium (E) has to satisfy:
, E<0 indicates that the market is in long run disequilibrium and E=0
indicates the market equilibrium. Shaffer (2004) argues that this condition is necessary only for perfect competition.
Data
This study uses the intermediation approach to modelling bank production. As suggested by Berger and Humphrey (1997) , the intermediation approach is best suited for evaluating bank efficiency, whereas the production approach is appropriate for evaluating the efficiency of bank branches. The dataset used in this study was obtained from the BankScope database. The data include 400 commercial banks in the 'old' European Union 15 covering the 2005-2012 period.
All data are deflated to 2010 prices.
In Table 1 , we list the variables in our model. Input variables include total personnel expenses, total interest expenses and total operating expenses. The output variables include total net loans, total securities, other earning assets and non-performing loans. We follow Klein As for the variables in the Rosse-Panzar model, we follow Matthews at al. (2007) and use the ratio of total revenue to total assets. The price elasticities include the price of labour (PL) defined as personnel expenses to fixed assets, the price of funds (PF) defined as total interest expenses on total deposits to total deposits and the price of capital defined as operating expenses to fixed assets.
<Insert Table 1 here>
Empirical results
Efficiency scores
Prior to discussing the convergence results, we focus on the efficiency results. In Table 2 , we report the estimated coefficients of the translog model. We note that all inputs have the expected negative signs and are statistically significant at the 1% level. We also observe that the elasticities of the desirable outputs are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.
Surprisingly, the elasticity of other earning assets is higher and hence more important in the production process than loans. The coefficient of the undesirable output ( ) has the correct sign, i.e. negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.
<Insert Table 2 here> In Table 3 <Insert Table 3 here> A further interesting observation is the reaction of commercial banks across the 'old' EU countries to the GFC. We would expect that shortly after the peak of GFC, banks would restructure their operational activities to improve or recover their efficiency. Surprisingly, however none of the listed countries show such an increase in efficiency or even a recovery back to the pre-crisis level of efficiency. Banks seem to be relatively slow to respond to endogenous and/or exogenous shocks in terms of adjusting their efficiency levels. This finding is in line with Tsionas (2006) who argues that efficiency does not quickly adjust following shocks to the system. In this case, the GFC has also been a unique event that bank managers may not have been able to handle in the best possible way. This crisis was further reinforced by the rapidly deteriorating balances and strict regulatory policies shortly after the crisis 13 unfolded. Bank balance sheets were substantially shrunk because of the credit crunch and an increase in NPLs. Consequently banks had to write off a large volume of assets. Although a number of large banks across the EU countries significantly reduced their labour costs in particular as well as operational expenses, this measure was insufficient to restore banks' technical efficiency.
Phillips and Sul (2007) log t-test
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In the next step in our analysis, we test for convergence in banking efficiency, firstly among the banks from the old EU countries (EU15); secondly among the banks from the 12 Eurozone countries 17 ; thirdly on a panel of asset-weighted country scores; and finally among the ten largest banks across the EU. The latter two sets are used to test whether size is a determining factor behind the integration process. Of noteworthy importance is the fact that the magnitude of the convergence coefficient, bˆ, provides key information on the rate of convergence.
Basically, the higher the value of bˆ, the faster the rate of convergence. The t-statistics obtained for the convergence test for technical efficiency scores for the panel of commercial banks within the EU15 and the 12 Eurozone countries for the period 2005-2012 are tabulated in Table   4 .
<Insert Table 4 here> Our results show a lack of convergence in European banking efficiency as the null hypothesis of group convergence is rejected for all four panels of efficiency scores.
14 Interestingly, we find that size, as a common factor, does not necessarily translate into convergence in bank efficiency during this period. 
where , is the efficiency score of bank i at period t, , −1 is the efficiency score at period t-1. are bank dummies and include fixed effects. β-convergence is present if the coefficient β is negative. The results for the β-convergence test (see Table 5 ) show that there is no evidence of convergence in banking efficiency as the coefficient of , −1 is positive for all 4 panel sets. These results therefore reinforce our results from the Phillips and Sul methodology.
<Insert Table 5 here> The lack of group convergence across the EU15 countries can be explained by two main reasons. Firstly, the cross-country heterogeneity in European banking in the form of various national legislations, limitations in the sharing of cross-border data, national institutional 15 characteristics, and country-specific macroeconomic variables, and secondly, the onslaught of the GFC which necessitated large bail-outs to avoid the spread of systemic risk.
In order to provide a deeper analysis of the impact of the GFC on European banking, we estimate the competition level for the following periods, 2005-2007 (pre-crisis), 2008-2010 (crisis) and 2011-12 (off-peak crisis). As discussed in our methodology, we measure competitiveness using the Rosse-Panzar model.
Before starting the analysis it is important to emphasize the assumption about the long-run equilibrium. Shaffer (2004) argues that the condition of long-run equilibrium is only requested for perfect competition. In other words, the results are not biased if the condition of market equilibrium does not hold. In Tables 6 and 7 we report the test for market equilibrium. We see that the condition is fulfilled for the whole period for the EU banking sector. However, if we test the hypothesis about the long-run equilibrium we cannot confirm it in our sub-samples. As can be partially compared with a few studies such as Casu and Girardone (2006) . However, the main difference in our study is that we do not include savings banks and cooperative banks. In our view, cooperative banks and savings banks operate exclusively in domestic market and their business activities are not affected by internationalization factors. Therefore, the reported levels of the H statistics in our study reflect the true competitive conditions within the market.
This is more in line with Molyneux et al (1994) .
<Insert Table 6 and 7 here>
Club clustering test
Phillips and Sul (2007) argue that the absence of group convergence may be due to the presence of some divergent members in the panel. Therefore, the next step in the analysis is the application of the Phillips and Sul (2007) clustering algorithm test which would potentially identify countries that are converging within different clusters and identify divergent members.
Hence, banking integration measured through efficiency should not be ruled out just on the basis of the log t-test but must be analysed together with the club clustering test results. The test is applied to the panel of asset-weighted technical efficiency scores for the 15 EU countries and to the group of ten top European banks 19 . The test statistics are reported in Table 8 .
Contrary to the log t-test results obtained for group convergence, we find the presence of club formation in both panels. The first club consists of Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Netherlands but shows relatively low level of convergence ( bˆ =0.890). The composition of the first club is revealing given that the first 3 countries have been severely hit by the crisis and engulfed in the Euro sovereign crisis. The second club regroups all the remaining 11 countries but exhibit weak convergence (bˆ = -2.90). As for the panel consisting of the top 10 EU banks, we find the presence of 2 clubs. The first club comprises HSBC (UK) and Crédit Agricole (FR) but the magnitude of convergence is weak (bˆ = -1.267), while all remaining 8 banks in the second club are divergent. So overall, we find that although group convergence is not present across the EU15 or Eurozone countries, the results for club convergence, albeit weak, suggest that the global financial crisis has not brought the integration process in the European banking sector to a complete standstill but that nonetheless, it has seriously impaired it.
<Insert Table 8 here>
Relative transition parameters for individual countries
The third component of the Phillips and Sul (2007) test consists of the estimation of each country's relative transition coefficient, ℎ . The transition coefficients (see Table 9 ) are estimated from each country's asset-weighted efficiency score per year relative to the panel cross-section average. Typically, if all loadings converge to the same value, δit →δ, then the relative transition parameters converge to one, hit →1 as the cross-sectional variance goes to zero. The relative transition coefficients for the EU15 countries indicate a noticeable convergence towards one between 2005 and 2008. However, starting in 2008, the gap between the countries' coefficients starts to widen and follow on this trajectory up to the end of the sample period, 2012. This heterogeneity is attributed to the occurrence of the GFC and its detrimental impact on the convergence process. Interestingly, it is also observed that the parameters for Finland, Sweden and Denmark exhibit a common path. Regional proximity could be the driving factor here. The path for Greece, a country besieged by financial turmoil is also clearly separate from the rest of the group while the path for Luxembourg is actually the furthest away from the group. The country's strong economic performance and resilient banking sector during the crisis seems to have demarcated it from the rest of the EU15.
<Insert Table 9 here>
Conclusion
This paper provides several important contributions to the ongoing empirical research on banking integration. Firstly, we use an advanced and comprehensive approach to measure bank efficiency. Secondly, we apply robust panel methodology to assess the convergence process in European banking. An integral part of the study is to investigate changes in bank efficiency before and during the GFC.
Our results show that the majority of countries experienced a fall in efficiency around the crisis period. The log t-test indicates that group convergence in bank efficiency is not present neither within the group of EU15 or within the Eurozone as a whole. The panel consisting of the top ten banks also show lack of convergence, although, club formation within the panels is present. However, all the clusters display weak convergence.
We attribute the lack of group convergence to the impact of the financial crisis on the European banking sector. The twin effects of the global crisis and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis have challenged the European banking sector in numerous ways. Instability has transpired through deteriorating loan portfolio quality and necessitating the bail-outs of large institutions across the EU15. European banks now face the challenges of re-regulation including higher capital requirements and lower leveraging, amongst others. These banks will have no choice but to attempt to regain the losses by improving their efficiency. In addition,
given the drive by the European Commission to reform the European banking sector into an efficient and stable system, European banks will have to utilise their assets more efficiently and with increased competition, the integration of European banking may well re-emerge.
The presented results also have important policy implications. The study unambiguously confirms that the GFC has undermined bank performance. The question that remains is whether the impact of the GFC is temporary or whether it will cause deeper problems for the integration process. The crisis has caused the collapse or an almost collapse of a large number of well-established EU banks. The main weakness of the integration process has been a weak and not fully implemented integrated framework for bank supervision and regulation.
We have witnessed a typical systemic crisis across the individual EU countries. With the benefit of hindsight, it is now evident that the financial crisis has thrown the financial integration process into reverse. The extensive rescue packages to the individual banks across the EU countries provided by EU authorities and domestic governments have not yet been fully materialized. We assume that the process of stabilising and consolidating the banking system will be longer than expected. Our results further reveal that the process of bank integration has been severely destabilised. When it comes to regulation, national regulators should play a pivotal role in the restructuring and tuning up the domestic banking sector. This argument is mainly supported by the fact the national financial regulator have detailed knowledge not only about the individual banks but also about the economic environment that has to be taken into account during this recovery period. In other words, a more individualistic approach should be adopted during this transition and recovery period.
The study can be further extended by conducting an analysis of productivity convergence over time and during the crisis years. Fuji et al. (2014) propose a new methodological framework that quantifies the contribution of individual components (outputs/inputs) to bank 20 efficiency and TFP change. Application of such a methodological framework might help better understand the bottlenecks of the convergence process. Last but not least, it would also be important to expand the analysed sample to include the new EU countries.
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To estimate the time-varying loadings, it g using the Phillips and Sul (2007) we rewrite (1) such that the common and idiosyncratic components are separated as follows: 
The so-called relative transition parameter it h measures it  in relation to the panel average at time t and therefore describes the transition path for country i relative to the panel average.
A.2. The log t regression
The log t regression test of convergence tests the following hypothesis:
The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level.
To conduct the Phillips and Sul's (2007) 20 procedure we use the following three steps:
Step 1: Calculate the cross sectional variance ratio t H H 1 is calculated as follows:
Step 2: Perform an OLS regression as follows: 20 The log t regression is also described in detail in Rughoo and Sarantis (2012) .
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where L(t) = log(t+1) and the fitted coefficient of log t is Step 3: Estimate a one-sided t test of null 0   using bˆand a standard error estimated using a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimator. As the test statistic b tˆ is normally distributed we reject the null hypothesis of convergence at b tˆ<-1.65. 
